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ABSTRACT
RFID is a powerful new technology that has the potential to
allow commercial retailers to undermine individual control over
private information. Despite the potential of RFID to undermine
personal control over such information, the federal government
has not enacted a set of practicable standards to ensure that
personal data does not become widely misused by commercial
entities. Although some potential privacy abuses could be
addressed by modifying RFID technology, this iBrief argues that
it would be wise to amend the Privacy Act of 1974 so that
corporations would have a statutory obligation to preserve
individual anonymity and respect the privacy preferences of
consumers.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
Modern technology is about to dethrone the old adage that
‘money makes the world go round.’ In some countries, the more apt
adage may very well soon turn out to be ‘RFID makes the world go
round.’
RFID, shorthand for “radio frequency identification
technology,” is already being used as a mandatory substitute for money
in some private establishments in Japan.2 This simple yet remarkable
technology consists of a small microchip, a protective sheath or
container, and a miniature embedded antenna; these components taken
together are referred to as RFID tags. 3 RFID tags are capable of
transmitting electronic-product-code (ePC) information to RFID
1
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readers—devices designed to store, process and archive tag data.4 Since
these tags are often quite small—the most technologically sophisticated
variants are now just the size of a grain of rice5— it is easy to see why
they have been heralded as a fantastic replacement for traditional
currency: if our currency can be embedded in a tiny RFID tag, it will be
both difficult to steal, eminently portable, and easy to replace in the
event the tag is lost or destroyed.
¶2
In addition to providing one technological solution to the search
for a workable form of “digital money,” RFID has also been used to
monitor everything from commercial purchases 6 to the physical
movements of government officials7 to the misadventures of naturally
curious children. 8 In February of 2005 the U.S. State Department
revealed a plan to embed RFID chips in every newly issued U.S.
passport, thereby broadcasting on demand the names, addresses, and
digitized photos of all American citizens to a database—ostensibly9 so
that borders can be more effectively managed and threats to national
security more readily prevented. 10 Data storage and transmission

4

Intermec Technologies Corporation, RFID Overview: Introduction to Radio
Frequency Identification, FORBES.COM, Jan. 1, 2002, available at
http://itresearch.forbes.com/data/detail?id=1010607230_712&type=RES&src=T
OPRES.
5
FDA Approves Computer Chip for Humans, MSNBC.COM, Oct. 13, 2004,
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/6237364/.
6
Kim Yong-Young, Radio Chips May Track Bank Notes, CNET NEWS.COM,
May 23, 2003, http://news.com.com/2100-1017-1009155.html.
7
Peter Lewis, RFID: Getting Under Your Skin?, CNNMONEY.COM, Aug. 5,
2004, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2004/08/05/commentary/ontechnology/rfid/.
8
Jo Best, Schoolchildren to be RFID Chipped: Japanese Authorities Decide
Tracking is the Best Way to Protect Kids, SILICON.COM, July 8, 2004,
http://networks.silicon.com/lans/0,39024663,39122042,00.htm.
9
Privacy advocates have suggested that one of the consequences, if not the
purposes, of embedding RFID chips in passports is that identity theft and
commercial data collectors will have an easier time clandestinely obtaining
personally identifying information. It is important, however, to distinguish
between the purpose of adopting RFID technology, on the one hand, and the
probable effects, desirable and unsavory alike, on the other. See Ryan Singel,
American Passports to Get Chipped, WIRED NEWS, Oct. 21, 2004,
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,65412,00.html.
10
Electronic Passport, 70 Fed. Reg. 8305 (proposed Feb. 18, 2005) (to be
codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 51). In April of 2005, Frank Moss, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Passport Services, said that the federal government was
reevaluating its proposed RFID system in light of widespread consensus that the
unencrypted personal information embedded in RFID tags could easily be
intercepted by nonauthorized third-parties. Kim Zetter, Feds Rethinking RFID

2

2005

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 20

functionality, however, is only the beginning. In addition, DeltaTRAK
recently announced that it has developed an RFID-based system for
detecting food spoilage during transit by monitoring temperature and
humidity fluctuations in food containment units. 11 Further, IBM and
EPC Global, the most powerful RFID standards-setting organization,
recently unveiled a plan to “create a database that contains the life
history of a product,” thus providing businesses with a new way to
streamline business supply chains.12 All things considered, RFID is a
promising technology many of us may soon be using to keep tabs on
virtually everything that is important to us—our kids, our finances, our
loved ones, and perhaps even our periodically wayward political figures.
¶3
Nevertheless, RFID is also a technology that could easily be
abused. For instance, if private companies embedded RFID tags in
products deemed dangerous or socially harmful, the implementation of a
centralized database of consumer purchasing patterns could be justified
to allow the government to track such purchases. This could have the
unwelcome effect of subjecting all consumers to suspicionless
monitoring; however, it should also be noted that for some products—
e.g., firearms and chemicals commonly used to make explosives—RFID
could also provide just the kind of highly accurate tracking system that
would benefit society. In any event, credible evidence that private
companies intend to deploy this new technology as widely as possible is
mounting.13 Moreover, it is also clear from a number of pilot tests in
Europe that corporations are eager—without customer consent or
authorization—to embed RFID chips in loyalty cards to monitor
purchasing habits.14
¶4
Under current privacy law, it is unlikely that consumer groups
would have the power to prevent private companies from adopting RFID
technology for a number of interlocking reasons. First, the Privacy Act

Passport, WIRED.COM, Apr. 26, 2005,
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,67333,00.html.
11
DeltaTRAK Launches RFID Humidity Sensor, FOODPRODUCTIONDAILY.COM,
May 11, 2004, http://www.foodproductiondaily.com/news/newsNG.asp?n=55887-deltatrak-launches-rfid.
12
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EXTREMETECH.COM, Nov. 8, 2004, at
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of 1974 (“Privacy Act” or “Act”)15—the most comprehensive U.S. law
pertaining to privacy—does not apply to private entities, but rather only
to government agencies or government-controlled corporations.16 Thus,
private corporations are not bound by the fair information practices,
open-access rules, and data-ownership principles embodied in the Act.17
But even if they were, consumer groups would arguably have a difficult
time preventing private companies from gathering data, since the Act
does not in principle proscribe data collection but merely proscribes a
narrow subset of data misuse.18 Second, constitutional protections are of
little use since the type of data that RFID is capable of collecting is
publicly ascertainable, and therefore probably not subject to protection
under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 19 Third, even in
jurisdictions that recognize the torts of intrusion and the appropriation of
private facts in consumer contexts,20 consumers would only be able to
recoup damages ex post; tort law is thus of no help in preventing data
aggregation per se. 21 This third feature of our privacy regime is
15

5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000).
Id. at § 552(a)(1).
17
James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Surveillance, Records &
Computers: Commercial Data and National Security, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1459, 1474 (2004) (pointing out that “[t]he act requires notice to, and consent
from, individuals when the government collects and shares information about
them”).
18
Id. (pointing out that while the “Privacy Act does include a provision that
extends its coverage to databases created under government contract,” this
particular provision “does not include governmental searches of private sector
databases already compiled and maintained for other purposes”).
19
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (holding that “what a person
knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection”).
20
It is highly unlikely that most jurisdictions would recognize these tort claims
in the consumer context. The private facts appropriated usually have to be of an
intimate and sensitive nature, strongly suggesting that tort theory is of little use
in articulating what is objectionable in the kind of data collection and item
tracking that RFID enables. The reason this is so is illustrated nicely by
Professor Post’s general observation that invasion of privacy tort claims are
successful only when “it can be demonstrated that a defendant has transgressed
the kind of social norms whose violation would properly be viewed with outrage
or affront, and that the function of this relief is to redress ‘injury to
personality’”. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community
and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 962 (1989).
21
A point of clarification is necessary here. In theory tort law could provide
some degree of deterrence, assuming that damage awards available to private
citizens for the torts of intrusion or appropriate of private facts were substantial
enough to prevent companies from collecting personally identifiable information
without customers’ consent. But in practice, tort law is highly unlikely to deter
16
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particularly discomfiting given that many of the recent private initiatives
designed to mitigate the dangers of data collection through technological
solutions have been wholly unsuccessful and fail to embody sound
privacy values.22
¶5
There are two broad threats to privacy posed by this new
technology. First, under our current privacy regime private companies
are at liberty to gather, process, and share customer data without
obtaining customer consent to specific data aggregation, archival, and
sharing policies and procedures.23 This feature of our privacy regime is

private companies because those companies understand that the value of a
potential damage award is unlikely to be large enough for a private citizen to
justify bringing suit in the first place. There are two reasons that this is so.
First, common law privacy jurisprudence applicable in these tort cases requires
that a breach of a privacy right be “offensive to the reasonable person.” W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 117 (5th ed. 1984). As
many commentators have recognized, this transforms privacy into a “moving
target,” and is for that reason an unreasonable, unworkable standard. Some have
even suggested that that “ultimate consequence of such an approach may be no
privacy at all.” Julie E. Cohen, The Law and Technology of Digital Rights
Management: DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY L. TECH. L.J. 575, 592 (2003).
Second, in order to establish a violation of privacy under current tort law one
must in most cases show that a private fact was disclosed in a way that caused
emotional or psychic distress. It is hard to imagine a court awarding money
damages to a plaintiff that claimed her privacy was violated because a company
used—without disclosing—her private consumer preferences. See Randall P.
Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News and Social Change,
1890–1990, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 1133 1170 n.111 (“Successful privacy cases have
never been legion. And recent experience is, if anything, worse both as to the
frequency of successful claims and as to the analytical difficulties associated
with rationalizing a favorable result.”).
22
See Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of
Privacy, 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, ¶89 (2001) (“[P3P] maps nicely to the
anti-regulatory views espoused by industry but not at all to the well-established
tradition of privacy protection in law. P3P in the end is an invitation to reject
privacy as a political value that can be protected in law and to ask individuals to
now bargain with those in possession of their secrets over how much privacy
they can afford.”).
23
See Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words are Worth a Picture: A Privacy
Tort Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 65 (2003)
(“Large companies like Acxiom, Experian, and R.L. Polk & Co. possess profiles
of nearly every American consumer and household. Acxiom's InfoBase profiler
collects data from more than 15 million sources and contains demographic
information on 95 percent of U.S. households. Experian boasts that its
databases cover 98 percent of U.S. households and can contain more than 1000
data items per household. Polk's ‘Automotive Profiling System’ contains
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particularly vexing given that we live in an era in which identity theft is
particularly common24 and extremely hard to prevent25; thus control over
private data is extremely important. Second, the absence of meaningful
regulation of new surveillance technologies, particularly RFID, is having
a profound effect on the broader social norms that privacy protects.
Private facts about consumer preference patterns are currently treated as
cost-free commodities for corporate America: companies need not pay
for the privilege of aggregating and using data, nor is consumer consent
regarded as necessary because consumer surveillance has already been
presented as a common practice that is usually in consumers’ best
interests.26
¶6
This iBrief argues that meaningful statutory regulation is
necessary for private-and public-sector RFID programs that collect
consumer data for purchase forecasting, preference modeling, and risk
profiling. The form that effective regulation should take is a matter of
dispute, but two models will be explored, a control oriented model and a
choice oriented approach. 27 Under the control oriented model, the
Privacy Act should be amended to embody privacy-protecting principles
that preserve the values of anonymity, seclusion, and control over certain
types of personal information. Under the choice oriented model, the

demographic and lifestyle information on more than 150 million vehicle owners
and 111 million households.”).
24
Timothy O’Brien, Identity Theft is an Epidemic, Can it Be Stopped?, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/24/business/yourmoney/24theft.html?ex=110
0322000&en=bf4604784fbfd500&ei=5070&oref=login.
25
See id. (suggesting that identity theft may be impossible to prevent since there
is no way to anticipate the technical creativity of ID-thieves).
26
See McClurg, supra note 23, at 66-7 (“Online, Internet advertising companies
such as DoubleClick track the clickstream of Internet users across the World
Wide Web, creating detailed profiles of their behavior. By storing small text
files called ‘cookies’ on the computers of persons visiting DoubleClickaffiliated sites, the company has stockpiled profiles of more than 100 million
individuals. Consumer profiling is not limited to companies that specialize in
data collection. Online booksellers and other retailers profile customers by
tracking the products they view or buy online. Telephone companies profile
customers based on when, how often, and what numbers they call.
Supermarkets profile shopping habits by recording and analyzing purchasing
information collected through discount or loyalty club cards. Banks and other
financial institutions construct profiles based on personal financial data. The
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 allows them to share customer financial data
with affiliated companies without restriction and to share it with anyone else if
customers do not explicitly opt out of such sharing.”).
27
For a general overview of the difference between control and choice-oriented
approaches to informational privacy, see Rotenberg, supra note 22, at ¶¶62–71.
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Privacy Act need only be amended in the most minor way—that is, to
require corporations to obtain explicit authorization from consumers
before gathering or using their private information. Although both of
these approaches toward new regulation could very well involve
modifying RFID technology, the status of informational privacy as a
public good requires that basic, fundamental control rights be given the
imprimatur of law even where technological safeguards serve as part of a
meaningful solution.
¶7
This iBrief is segmented into three sections. Part I explores the
historical development and current capabilities of RFID. Part II
considers the implications of this new technology for privacy. This
section focuses on the potential for RFID to serve in the near future as
the primary tool for tracking physical objects and people; specifically,
this section explores the arguments weighing in favor and against the
control and choice-oriented approaches to regulating consumer privacy.
Part II ultimately advocates a control-oriented model of privacy
protection is advocated in this Part, mainly in light of the potential for
mass consumer surveillance to become a central feature of commerce in
the near future if decisive legislative action is not taken. Finally, Part III
proposes an amendment to the Privacy Act of 1974 and explores the
advantages and disadvantages of such an amendment.

I. THE CAPABILITIES OF RFID TECHNOLOGY
¶8
The powerful object identification and tracking capabilities of
RFID are made possible by a discovery made just before the outbreak of
World War II. Scientists at that time discovered that radio waves can be
used to identify specific objects in the physical world if those objects are
affixed with unique identifying numbers or codes.28 As long as an object
has a unique number associated with it, accurate identification would be
a very simple affair.29 This discovery proved quite useful in the World
War II, since the United Kingdom needed an effective, reliable way to
distinguish its own fighter planes from inbound German fighters.30 RFID
fit the bill because it allowed for the reliable, remote identification of
objects.31

RFID was never adopted as the standard for object identification.
In the 1970s, the bar code—or Universal Product Code (UPC)—became
the most widely used method for identifying and tracking objects as they
¶9

28

WIKIPEDIA, RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION (RFID),
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RFID (last visited Aug. 25, 2005).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
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passed through commercial channels.32 UPC labels were never the ideal
technology for managing supply chains and monitoring inventory, for
three simple reasons: 1) the labels themselves are easy to disfigure or
disable, 2) UPCs must be read at a certain angle, slowing down the
monitoring process considerably, and 3) UPCs are typically read
sequentially—meaning that multiple UPC labels cannot be read
simultaneously.33
¶10
RFID is a much more robust technology. While RFID tags can
be disabled through physical abuse or destruction, they need not be read
at an angle and they can be read simultaneously. The typical system
includes tags, an antenna, and a reader or scanner. 34 Tags, usually
miniature silicon chips affixed to micro-antennae, come in two
varieties—active and passive.35 Active tags contain a power source that
enables them to send data without being prompted by a reader; passive
tags cannot transmit data themselves but are merely read by local reading
devices.36 Active and passive tags usually have read-write capability, a
feature that is extremely appealing given the advent of the electronic
product code (ePC). The ePC is a 96-bit numerical code saved onto the
RFID tag itself, and is best viewed as an extension of the current UCC12 protocol for naming and tracking objects globally.37 The advantages
of using RFID tags in conjunction with the ePC are numerous: not only
can these small, often unnoticeable tags be logged without cumbersome
physical manipulation, most RFID systems can read ePC numbers
through fog, snow and even paint so long as the tags themselves are
within standard read range.38

32

Checkout Lines Could Become History, USATODAY.COM,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/science/stuffworks/2001-04-24-smartlabels.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2005).
33
WIKIPEDIA, UNIVERSAL PRODUCT CODE,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_Product_Code (last visited Aug. 25,
2005).
34
Intermec Technologies Corporation, RFID Overview, supra note 4, at 3.
35
Active tags are generally larger, more expensive, and have a longer read
range. Passive tags, on the other hand, are often very small, inexpensive, and
offer long operational life. See WIKIPEDIA, supra note 28, at Types of RFID
TAGS.
36
The Association of the Automatic Identification and Data Capture Industry,
Draft Paper on the Characteristics of RFID Systems, AIMGLOBAL.ORG, July
2000, http://www.aimglobal.org/technologies/rfid/what_is_rfid.asp.
37
Mark Roberti, ePC Networking on Display, RFIDJOURNAL.COM (May 24,
2004), http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/957/1/1/.
38
Some RFID chips can be temporarily disabled by enveloping them in Mylar
fabric or by placing a metal plate between the chips and a reader. Josh McHugh,
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ODIN Technologies, an RFID systems integrator based in
Reston, Virginia, recently released a comprehensive performance study
of eight different tag-types.39 The study revealed what many industry
analysts had been expecting to hear: the best passive tags can be read
from multiple angles and while moving at considerable speed—from 600
to 1200 feet per second.40 Yet even though passive tags can be read very
quickly, they generally cannot be read from very far away unless they
operate on the higher frequencies. High frequency tags can currently be
read from up to 3 or 4 meters away, 41 though in the near future
technological improvements will make it feasible to read high frequency
tags from a greater distance. 42 RFID is thus an extremely powerful
technology that allows for the quick and accurate identification of
physical objects—from foodstuffs to clothing to electronic gadgets. To
get a sense of just how powerful this technology is, imagine for just a
moment a machine that could instantly identify the origin, cost, and
properties of every consumer item carried (electronic gadgets, e.g.), worn
(clothing, e.g.), or consumed (food and drink, e.g.). That machine is
RFID. And the technology to make that machine exists today, right now.
¶11

¶12
The potential range of uses for RFID technology is hard to
predict at this nascent state of development. But there are a number of
important uses already underway:

1. GENERAL
TRACKING
AND
SECURITY
PURPOSES: Tagging airline baggage, prisoners, cars for
tollways,43 and tagging at the pallet level all goods and
products destined for delivery to the U.S. Department of
Defense.44

A Chip in Your Shoulder, SLATE.COM, Nov. 10, 2004,
http://slate.msn.com/id/2109477/.
39
Catherine O’Connor, ODIN Benchmarks RFID ePC Tags,
RFIDJOURNAL.COM, Oct. 21, 2004,
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1199/1/1/.
40
Id.
41
The Magic of RFID: How it Works, ACMQUEUE.COM, Oct. 2004,
http://www.acmqueue.com/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=2
16&page=2.
42
See id. (pointing out that advances in silicon chip conductivity will allow high
frequency tags to be read from farther away in the future).
43
Karen Dearne, Radio Tags Take to the Plains, AUSTRALIANITNEWS.COM,
Nov. 9, 2004,
http://australianit.news.com.au/articles/0,7204,11302583%5E15841%5E%5Enb
v%5E,00.html.
44
Darrell Dunn, Defense Department Delays RFID Deadline Until At Least
February, INFORMATIONWEEK.COM, Nov. 12, 2004,
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=52601247.
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2. ANTI-FRAUD MEASURES:
Combating drug
counterfeiting in the pharmaceuticals industry.45
3. STREAMLINING
BUSINESS
PROCESSES:
Improving inventory control and reducing inefficiencies
in the drug industry due to overstocking or expiry.46
4. CURRENCY SUBSTITUTES:
substitute for regular money.47

Providing

a

5. BORDER SECURITY:
Ensuring that low-risk
individuals are able to safely traverse major international
borders.48
6. ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY: Creating new
ways of ensuring that toxic substances are not illegally
dumped into the environment.49
7. HUMAN MONITORING:
Establishing new
methods for track the movements and behavior of
children.50

Each application of RFID has the potential to be beneficial by increasing
safety and accountability, as well as the potential to violate forms of
privacy worth protecting.
¶13
The most recent controversy over RFID emerged when the FDA
announced its approval51 of the VeriChip, an implantable device carrying
a unique key that hospitals and other health-care providers could use to
instantaneously access medical records in an emergency situation. 52
Privacy advocates responded to this new development by pointing out a
host of potential problems with implanting such a chip: 1) VeriChip is

45

Martin Downs, Counterfeit Drugs: A Rising Public Health Problem,
WEBMD.COM, http://my.webmd.com/content/Article/95/103346.htm.
46
See Dearne, supra note 43.
47
See Tracking Arcade Game Players, supra note 2.
48
Nexus: Life in the Fast Lane—RFID Powers Border Crossing Program,
AIMGLOBAL.ORG, May 15, 2004,
http://www.aimglobal.org/members/news/templates/casestudies.asp?articleid=1
34&zoneid=25.
49
Japan: Radio Tags Drafted for Eco-compliance, CNETASIA.COM,
http://asia.cnet.com/news/systems/0,39037054,39186726,00.htm.
50
See Best, supra note 8.
51
Letter of Evaluation, Office of Device Evaluation of the Center For Devices
and Radiological Health, VeriChip ™ Health Information Microtransponder
System (Oct. 12, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data924642/0001068880004000587/ex99p2
.txt.
52
See McHugh, supra note 38.
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not medically safe53; 2) the potential for unauthorized access to medical
records is a serious drawback of the system54; and 3) without effective
regulation prior to the wide-implementation of these implants, the
likelihood of invasive data aggregation, improper violations of
anonymity, and other violations of personal privacy is very high.55
¶14
Of course, critics of RFID technology often overlook or
intentionally downplay the fact that extremely Orwellian RFID systems
would require an integrated network of readers in addition to the
ubiquitous affixation of tags. For an individual’s personally identifiable
information to be transparent, tags must be 1) affixed to physical objects,
2) close enough to readers to transmit whatever information they contain,
and 3) not covered by fabric or obscured by other materials that interfere
with data transmission. But such critics accurately portray RFID as a
technology that in its current and prospective uses represents a way for
corporations to keep tabs on its clientele without any pro tanto benefit
for ceding personal data.

II. UNDERSTANDING WHAT RFID MEANS FOR CONSUMER PRIVACY
If RFID were to become pervasive, it would certainly be one of
the most powerful single modalities of surveillance. Where video
surveillance is hobbled by the current limitations of facial recognition
technology, even passive RFID tags could allow for accurate
identification of individuals in a reader-rich environment. 56 Where
paying cash for consumer purchases allows one to avoid leaving an
electronic trail for interested parties to investigate, RFID may in Europe
soon be embedded in currency, leaving no option for the privacyconscious consumer who wants her purchases to remain anonymous.57
And where individual credit card companies are only able to analyze and
¶15

53

See Letter of Evaluation, supra note 51, at 3 (“The potential risks to health
associated with the device are: adverse tissue reaction; migration of implanted
transponder; compromised information security; failure of implanted
transponder; failure of inserter; failure of electronic scanner; electromagnetic
interference; electrical hazards; magnetic resonance imaging incompatibility;
and needle stick.”).
54
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) VeriChip Page, EPIC.ORG, at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/rfid/verichip.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2005).
55
FDA Approves Computer Chip, supra note 5.
56
However, hardware-based object recognition technology has recently seen
significant advances, allowing commercially available cameras to track basic
motion, the appearance and movements of objects—including people, animals
and automobiles. Donna Howell, Video Surveillance Develops Sharper Sight,
INVESTOR’S BUSINESS DAILY, Oct. 20, 2004, at A04.
57
Winston Chai, Euro Notes May Be Radio Tagged, ZDNETUK.COM, May 22,
2003, http://news.zdnet.co.uk/business/0,39020645,2135074,00.htm.
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assess data about the purchases you make with your particular credit
card, a well-designed RFID reader-environment could very well
assemble a comprehensive picture of your purchasing preferences.58 For
example, a store equipped with a number of strategically placed RFID
readers could assemble a portrait of a particular consumer’s preferences
by tracking what items she selected while in the store and then making
special offers on the basis of that portrait at the checkout counter. Given
that RFID readers have recently been miniaturized, it is not difficult to
imagine companies—particularly businesses like Target and Walmart—
placing RFID readers at store entrances and exists, and at strategic points
along store aisles for targeted-advertising purposes.59
¶16
Even without a reader-rich environment, RFID is an especially
invasive technology because it threatens to make it extremely easy for
companies to gather, archive and utilize private data in three ways. First,
embedding RFID tags in consumer goods allows companies to learn
precisely what customers are buying by conditioning discounts and
special offers upon revealing personal information that a consumer
would otherwise want to remain private. 60 As noted above, such
knowledge allows for highly efficient targeted-advertising, which some
regard as an annoyance and others as a significant invasion of privacy.
Regardless of whether such advertising is regarded as invasive by a
particular customer, the lack of privacy protection represents an unfair
burden on privacy-conscious consumers: to object to RFID-enabled
consumer surveillance, customers would have to forfeit the benefits
associated with purchasing items from a particular store or carrying a
tagged discount card. In other words, even if RFID readers only appear

58

This is one way of conceptualizing the threat that RFID technology poses to
consumer privacy. However, even the U.S. Government Accountability Office
has recognized the genuine threat RFID poses to the confidentiality of consumer
information. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFORMATION
SECURITY: RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT, GAO-05-551 21 (May 2005) (“Profiling is the reconstruction of
a person’s movements or transactions over a specific period of time, usually to
ascertain something about the individual’s habits, tastes, or predilections.
Because tags can contain unique identifiers, once a tagged item is associated
with a particular individual, personally identifiable information can be obtained
and then aggregated to develop a profile of the individual.”)
59
See World’s Smallest RFID Reader Developed in UK, FERRET.COM, Dec. 6,
2004, (reporting that the UK-based company Innovation Research &
Technology has developed a 12mm by 2mm fully-operational RFID reader)
available at http://www.ferret.com.au/articles/6d/0c029a6d.asp.
60
For the purposes of this iBrief I assume, without providing an independent
argument, that social policy should be designed with the privacy-conscious
consumer in mind.
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in department and outlet stores, the perceived and real costs of opting-out
will be enough to coerce customers—customers who would otherwise
not want their purchasing patterns archived—to accept this new
technology on whatever non-negotiated terms retailers offer.
¶17
Second, and closely related to the first objection, under extant
privacy law companies could offer an opt-out policy but then lawfully
shift the costs of opting out of a scheme like RFID to non-consenting
consumers. This could be done in a number of ways. For example,
companies already offer discount cards to customers that provide
personal information. The cost of offering discounts could be offset by
customers who opt-out of RFID-enabled discount programs.
Alternatively, mathematical forecasting models could predict the
expected economic impact of (1) opt-out rates on RFID-card discount
programs and (2) item-level tagging on gross revenues to spread the
costs—i.e., expected diminution in sales—of adopting RFID by
increasing the price of goods. 61 In short, current privacy law allows
companies to sidestep consumer resistance to RFID with the help of
economic forecasting.
¶18
Third, since increased advertising has a marked effect on
purchasing patterns,62 and advertising generally is subject to protection
under the First Amendment, existing privacy law actually subsidizes
corporate speech where RFID is utilized as a technique for enhancing
marketing efforts. Privacy law subsidizes corporate speech because the
technologies of advertising—in this case RFID—are paid for, in one way
or another, by customers, and not by the private interests who benefit
from those new advertising methods.63 To be sure, privacy law does not
have the effect of subsidizing corporate speech (advertising) in cases
where the costs of marketing methods is not borne by a company’s target
market. But in cases where such costs are shouldered by consumers,
corporate speech is certainly being subsidized. Put another way, if
meaningful legislation giving consumers an opt-in right is not enacted,

61

Here it is important to note that economists would insist that the survival of
RFID depends critically on whether it does lower the cost of distributing goods.
Whether RFID would in all industries is beyond the scope of this iBrief; suffice
it to say that many large retailers currently assume that RFID will reduce the
costs of distributing goods and should therefore be adopted.
62
See generally Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Commercial Speech and the First
Amendment: “Too Much Puff”: Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial
Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1215–17 (1988).
63
To the best of my knowledge, the argument that current privacy law
subsidizes corporate speech by not providing a mandatory opt-in option for
consumers has not been made by any of the academic critics of RFID
technology.
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private companies could, without abrogating any law or legal principle,
stealthily cajole consumers into supporting marketing efforts designed,
ironically, to induce those very same consumers to spend more money.
This discussion assumes, of course, that the terms offered will be
unsavory to the privacy-conscious consumer. In practice, this may not
always be the case. However, the argument of this iBrief does not turn
on empirical facts about how many private companies are likely to
provide a quid pro quo that privacy-conscious consumers find
unappealing. Rather, the argument here turns on whether consumers
should have to cede even more information to private companies than
they already do. Critics of this argument could argue that consumers
already give away much private information to private companies
through opting-in to discount-card programs at retail outlets. There is
some truth to this, and indeed it would be odd to claim that the privacy
threats posed by ordinary discount-cards and RFID technology are
radically different. Nevertheless, there are two powerful ripostes to this
criticism. First, because RFID tags are embedded in objects customers
cannot decide in a particular circumstance to retain their privacy—as
they surely can with discount-cards by not using them at the cash
register. Second, a technological standard for RFID tags is likely to
emerge in the near future that would allow retailers to “read” the RFID
tags of other retailers, thus learning the consumer preferences of their
competitors’ customers without the permission of those customers. In
short, RFID is a technology that provides retailers a way to avoid ever
asking their customers to provide any consent whatsoever to commercial
monitoring practices.
¶19

¶20
Given that (1) consumers are not provided with the choice to
opt-in, (2) there are no safeguards in place to prevent companies from
passing on the costs of RFID to consumers, and (3) the lack of such
safeguards amounts to a mandatory subsidy of commercial speech, a
control-oriented approach should be adopted in amending the Act. A
control-oriented approach would enhance consumer autonomy by
providing an opportunity for consumers to opt out and it would prevent
companies from passing on the costs of RFID to consumers in a furtive
effort to subsidize commercial marketing efforts. In other words, a wellcrafted amendment would address each of the three concerns previously
examined.

III. EAST COAST V. WEST COAST CODE: HOW SHOULD RFID BE
REGULATED?
¶21
Privacy law scholars familiar with technology have traditionally
made a distinction between ‘East Coast’ code, that is, legal regulations
that govern access to personal information, and ‘West Coast’ code, that
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is, the body of rules and constraints built directly into a particular
technology. Both types of code can be helpful in regulatory contexts,
and each has its own virtues and demerits. But even though West Coast
code is sometimes helpful in protecting liberal democratic values—
including privacy, free speech and personal dignity—in many instances
this code will not effectively protect our values if not induced by law, by
East Coast code, to do so.64
¶22
Complicating this picture somewhat is the fact that EPCglobal,
(formerly known as the Auto-ID center 65 ), a research consortium
consisting of 5 major universities and over 100 private companies, has
suggested that all RFID devices affixed to consumer goods include a kill
switch. 66 This switch would deactivate the tag immediately after a
purchase was completed, thereby making it impossible for companies to
learn the origin, price, and unique identification number of clothing
items, personal electronic devices, and other objects owned by
customers. 67 Privacy initiatives such as these are certainly wellintentioned, and the technological fixes they suggest are often quite
reasonable. But these initiatives share a common weakness: private
companies are not bound to abide by principles they voluntarily adopt.

Current privacy law consists of federal laws and regulations—
including the Privacy Act of 1974 (“Act”), 68 the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 69 (“ECPA”), the Fair Credit
Reporting Act of 197070 (“FCRA”) and the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act 71 (“HIPPA”)—as well as private tort law.
Subsection A examines whether existing federal regulations and private
tort law are sufficient to address the privacy implications of RFID.
Subsection B introduces a proposed amendment to the Privacy Act, and
considers how effective such an amendment might be in preventing
RFID abuses.

¶23

64

See generally, LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE
(1999) (arguing that West Coast code is often unwilling or unable to protect core
liberal values, including privacy and free speech).
65
The Auto-ID Center is now known as EPC Global, Inc. See generally
WELCOME TO EPCGLOBAL, INC, http://www.epcglobalinc.org (last visited Aug.
25, 2005).
66
Paul Boutin, We Know What You’re Buying, SLATE.COM, Sep. 5, 2003, at
http://slate.msn.com/id/2087976/.
67
Id.
68
5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000).
69
See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 25102522, 2701-2709, 3121-3126 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
70
Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681(u) (1994).
71
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections 29 and 42 of U.S.C.).
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A. The Limits of Extant Privacy Law
¶24
Existing privacy law is not flexible enough to cover potential
abuses of RFID. Consider first the federal laws and corresponding
regulations that constrain data collection. The Act, as mentioned earlier,
does not apply until data or information has been collected.72 According
to the Government Accountability Office, “the Privacy Act is likely to
have a limited application to the implementation of RFID technology
because the act only applies to the information once it is collected, not to
whether or how to collect it.” 73 The Act provides citizens a right to
review private information collected by government agencies, 74 and a
concomitant right to correct misinformation, 75 but the Act does not
currently contemplate the myriad dimensions of data privacy implicated
by new surveillance technologies.76
¶25
The ECPA and the FCRA do not fare any better. The ECPA
provides a number of important regulations for electronic
communications, including a general bar against peddling personal
information culled through electronic transactions. 77 Unfortunately,
“information” under the EPCA only refers to the contents of
communications; transactional records can lawfully be disclosed, even
sold, so long as the purchaser is not the federal government.78 Thus,
while RFID systems capable of recording consumer conversations could
very well fall under the ECPA, this statute could not readily be used to
prevent companies from culling and sharing transactional data. 79

72

5 U.S.C. § 552(a).
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 60, at 23.
74
5 U.S.C. § 552(d)(1).
75
Id. § 552(d)(2)-(3).
76
See Jerry Kang, Informational Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1193, 1231 (1998) (arguing that the Privacy Act, and other omnibus
privacy statutes, utterly fail to protect data privacy because “they apply only to
government action”).
77
18 U.S.C. 2511(1)(c)-(d); see also Kang, supra note 76, at 1234 (pointing out
that data aggregators cannot “divulge the contents of the communications during
transmission or while in storage”).
78
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A).
79
The Senate Report accompanying the ECPA makes it very clear that the
content of a communication is distinct from the status or existence of the
transaction itself. Thus, when the ECPA is read in light of its legislative intent,
it is virtually impossible to argue that it prohibits the free sharing of
transactional data. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 13 (1986), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3567; see also Kang, supra note 76, at 1235 (“The upshot
of this analysis is that the ECPA constrains a communication provider's
exploitation of personal information in only limited ways. Although electronic
communications providers to the public must keep the contents of
73
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Similarly, FCRA, would not be of much help. In addition to being
designed for a completely unrelated regulatory purpose the FCRA does
not even constrain what third-party payment providers can do with
sensitive consumer information,80and courts have consistently held that
such information can be exchanged with impunity as long as a
“legitimate business interest” can be identified.81
¶26
Robust opt-in rules, however, have been adopted for healthcare
information under HIPAA. In fact, HIPAA’s privacy rule 82 requires
health care providers to obtain explicit consent prior to using or
disclosing sensitive health information.83 The privacy rule is far from
toothless, as HIPAA84 provides for stiff civil and criminal penalties for
violations of patients’ privacy rights.85 The privacy rule prohibits the use
or disclosure of health information which identifies or can be associated
with a particular individual without prior consent, requires that
healthcare providers and health-information clearinghouses take
reasonable steps to notify individuals of their privacy rights, and requires
that a report be made to patients whenever there is an intentional or
negligent disclosure of their data.86 But unfortunately, HIPAA’s privacy
rule only covers health-care information; it is not a generally applicable
privacy law.87
¶27
Tort law and Supreme Court jurisprudence have proven
disappointing as well. Tort law recognizes four different kinds of
privacy violations, including (1) intrusion upon seclusion, (2) public
disclosure of private facts, (3) appropriation of name or likeness, and (4)
publicity that places another in a false light. 88 Some scholars have

communications confidential, they have almost no such obligation regarding
transactional records.”).
80
15 U.S.C. §§ 1581a(d), 1581b(3)(e); see also Kang, supra note 76, at 1236.
81
Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Legitimate Business Interest: No End in Sight? An
Inquiry into the Status of Privacy in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 77, 80
(1996).
82
Standard for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45
C.F.R. §§ 164.502, 164.506 (2002).
83
Id.
84
42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-5(a)(1), 1320d-6(b) (2000).
85
See Mary L. Durham, Note, How Research Will Adapt to HIPAA: A View from
Within the Healthcare Delivery System, 28 AM. J. L. AND MED. 491, 500 (2002)
(“HIPAA imposes civil penalties of up to $ 25,000 and criminal penalties of up
to $ 250,000 or ten years in prison for every violation.”).
86
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2001).
87
See generally, Ryan Lowther, Note, U.S. Privacy Regulations Dictated by EU
Law: How the Healthcare Profession May be Regulated, 41 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 435 (2003).
88
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B, 652D, 652C, 652E (1977).
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argued that the first tort—intrusion upon seclusion—could in theory be
actionable without a violation of one’s physical space.89 This argument
would be specious if applied to RFID: absent federal privacy
regulations, the prevalence of RFID tags would probably not be regarded
as “highly offensive to the reasonable person,”90 a requirement for tort
liability under the Restatement Second of Torts. In addition, there is no
constitutional right to informational privacy, although on one occasion
the Supreme Court did come close to endorsing such a right. In Whalen
v. Roe, 91 a case about whether a state recordkeeping statute violated
privacy, the Court cleverly avoided deciding whether there exists a clear
right to privacy under the U.S. Constitution.92 While the majority did
intimate that under some circumstances the government may have a
constitutional obligation to “avoid unwarranted disclosures,”93 the Court
did not specify what those circumstances might be nor was it willing to
extend such hypothetical privacy protections to contexts in which data is
collected by private, non-governmental organizations.94
There are a number of advantages to Congressional action
recognized by scholars in the broader context of protecting private data
from unwanted collection and use.95 And although privacy consortiums
and interest groups periodically resist the efforts of corporations to
collect private data, efforts at the federal,96 state,97 and local98 level to
¶28

89

Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1089, 1106 (1998).
90
RESTATEMENT, supra note 88, § 652B cmt. a, b.
91
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
92
Id.
93
Id. at 605.
94
Id.
95
See Kang, supra note 76, at 1246–66 (arguing that Congressional regulation is
often necessary because market forces alone do not protect privacy to a
reasonably acceptable degree).
96
For examples of general opt-in legislation at the federal level, see Consumer's
Right to Financial Privacy Act, H.R. 2720, 107th Cong. (2001); Privacy Act of
2001, S. 1055, 107th Cong. (2001); Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail
Act of 2001, H.R. 718, 107th Cong. (2001); Online Personal Privacy Act, S.
2201, 107th Cong. (2001); Financial Institution Privacy Protection Act of 2001,
S. 450, 107th Cong. (2001); Consumer Online Privacy and Disclosure Act, H.R.
347, 107th Cong. (2001); Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of 2001,
H.R. 95, 107th Cong. (2001).
97
For examples of proposals at the state level, see S.B. 1258, 45th Leg., 2d Sess.
(Ariz. 2002); Financial Privacy Protection Act of 2002, A.B. 1775, 2001-02
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002); H.F. 285, 79th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2001);
Consumer Privacy Act, S.B. 2988, 224th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001); Consumer
Internet Privacy Act, S.B. 4402, 224th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001); S.B. 1547, 48th
Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2001).
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adopt opt-in privacy standards for personal data have often failed. The
very fact that these efforts have failed evidences not only the political
influence that private companies possess, but also the necessity of
amending the Act. Congress is, however, aware of the problem. In
recent congressional hearings on the privacy implications of RFID, Paula
J. Bruening of the Center for Democracy and Technology deftly
articulated the importance of enacting sensible privacy protections before
RFID becomes ubiquitous:
[I]t is more effective and efficient to begin at the outset of the
development process to create a culture of privacy that incorporates
sound technical protections for privacy and that establishes the key
business and public policy decisions for respecting privacy in RFID use
before RFID is deployed, rather than building in privacy after a scandal
or controversy erupts publicly.99

B. A Privacy Act for the Digital Age
¶29
The Act should be amended to explicitly apply a control-oriented
privacy approach to the activities of private corporations and providers of
consumer services and goods. This iBrief proposes the following
amendment to the Act:

Under the Privacy Act of 1974, as hereby amended, corporations have a
statutory obligation to (1) minimize the amount of data collected and
preserve individual anonymity whenever possible, and (2) in contexts
where anonymity cannot for technological or administrative reasons be
protected, obtain explicit permission from citizens to use (a) personally
identifying information for specific purposes disclosed to the consumer
and (b) information that aggregates consumer data in ways that threaten

98

For examples of successful legislation at the local level, see Contra Costa
County, Cal., Code ch. 518-4 (2002) (requiring financial institutions to obtain
explicit consumer consent before disseminating private data); Daly City, Cal.,
Ordinance 1295 (Sept. 9, 2002) (requiring notice and consent prior to the
disclosure of private financial information); Daly City, Cal., Ordinance 1297
(Nov. 12, 2002) (same); S.F., Cal., Bus. & Tax Regs. Code art. 20 (2002)
(same); San Mateo County, Cal., Ordinance 4126 (Aug. 6, 2002) (regulating the
disclosure of confidential consumer information), San Mateo County, Cal.,
Ordinance 4144 (Nov. 5, 2002) (same).
99
RFID Technology: What the Future Holds for Commerce, Security, and the
Consumer: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer
Prot. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 28 (2004)
(statement of Paula J. Bruening, Staff Counsel, Center for Democracy and
Technology).
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consumer anonymity whenever a new tracking technology is used for a
substantially commercial purpose.100
Under the amended Act, (3) private companies may not discriminate
against consumers who refuse to have their personal information
collected via RFID or similar technologies. Private companies may not
provide differential services, preference programs, or special incentives
despite whatever differential costs are associated with selling goods or
providing services to non-consenting consumers that are not associated
with selling or providing similar goods or services to consumers who
consent to have their personal information archived and used for fully
disclosed purposes.
¶30
Provision (1) is the data-minimization principle, necessary to
prevent corporate interests from collecting, archiving, using and selling
data in a format that violates anonymity. This is the fundamental rule of
the amendment, for it stipulates that consumer anonymity is a more
important value than targeted advertising. For instance, this provision,
when read in conjunction with provision (2), would make it unlawful for
Wal-Mart to associate purchase-related data gathered via RFID with
specific customers unless explicit consent had been obtained prior to data
collection. Notice also that provision (1), when read in conjunction with
(2), prohibits collecting specific types of data for which a company has
not already obtained permission.101

Provision (2) is the opt-in principle, necessary to prevent
companies from collecting data surreptitiously from consumers and then
using that data in unauthorized ways. This provision has much in
common with standard opt-out principles that have already been
proposed or promulgated in connection with informational privacy. 102
The main difference between provision (2) and standard opt-out

¶31

100

Provision (2) shares some similarities with a bill introduced in the House of
Representatives in 2004, commonly referred to as the Opt Out of ID Chips Act.
Though never enacted, the Act would have (a) required warning labels on all
products carrying RFID tags, and (b) provided consumers with a right to have
RFID tags permanently disabled at the time of purchase. See H.R. 4673, 108th
Cong. (2004), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/z?c108:H.R.4673.IH:.
101
Provision (1) is somewhat similar to Professor Kang’s proposed default rule
for governing cyberspace transactions: “Such personal information may be
processed only in functionally necessary ways” but parties are “free to contract
around the default rule.” Kang, supra note 76, at 1268.
102
For a good example of a federal statute and regulatory regime based on optout principles, see the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 502, 113
Stat. 1338, 1437-40 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)
(outlining the obligations of financial institutions regarding the disclosure of
personal information).
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principles is that companies would have to obtain explicit consent from
customers before collecting and using their personal data. It is possible
that an opt-in provision would make RFID-enabled data collection more
expensive, since the costs of data collection would include the time and
resources expended to obtain explicit consent.103 But this is a virtue—
not a drawback—of this proposed amendment.
¶32
Provision (3) is the anti-discrimination principle, a provision
indispensable to protect consumers from shouldering the cost of optingout of a data-collection scheme like RFID. For instance, this provision
would have the welcome effect of preventing, at least in some cases,
companies from offering wildly differential pricing to customers who
decided to opt-out of an RFID-discount card program. This is perhaps
the most politically controversial aspect of the proposed amendment,
because industry advocacy groups would certainly view this provision as
a way to stifle completely the “right” of private companies to provide
incentives for customers to willingly reveal personal information.

CONCLUSION
The proposal outlined in this iBrief is modest, pragmatic, and
most importantly, proportional to the threat that RFID represents to
informational privacy. Nonetheless, it is a proposal that is clearly out of
line with our current practices. We are all to ready to disclose private
aspects of our lives to commercial entities, too eager to give up forms of
anonymity that we would do better to insist upon.104 Recent trends to
trade away privacy protections are often predicated upon misplaced,
erroneous notions that technological progress is an unqualified good, a
claim grounded in the unchallenged assumption that the technology
industry itself is committed to antigovernment libertarianism. 105
¶33

103

See generally, Michael E. Staten & Fred H. Cate, The Impact of Opt-in
Privacy Rules on Retail Credit Markets: A Case Stud of MBNA, 52 DUKE L.J.
745 (2003) (arguing that opt-in rules generally neutralize the many of the
efficiency gains obtained through technologically advanced data collection
techniques).
104
Even fervent privacy advocates have accepted the dubious notion that
industry-driven controls are preferable to legislative action. See Declan
McCullagh, RFID Tags: Big Brother in Small Packages, CNET.COM, Jan. 13,
2003, http://ecousticscnet.com.com/RFID+tags+Big+Brother+in+small+packages/2010-1069_3980325.html?tag=nl.
105
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM
IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 127 (2004) (“The entrepreneurs of Silicon Valley like to
think of themselves as antigovernment libertarians, and the business nostrums of
the era before the dot-com crash assumed that the Internet would lead inevitably
to the end of hierarch and centralized authority and the flourishing of individual
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Corporations, whether they are steeped in new technology or firmly
grounded in the world of bricks-and-mortar, have never been committed
as a matter of principle to something as heady and theoretical as
libertarianism.
Even well-intentioned private efforts, such as
EPCglobal’s suggestion that RFID tags be disabled once purchases are
made, can be voluntarily disregarded and do not carry the force and
legitimacy of law.
¶34
Early international norms governing privacy also failed to take
seriously the threat posed by corporate stalking. For instance, in 1950
Article 8 of the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“Convention”) was adopted,
declaring that “everyone has a right to respect for his private and family
life” and that “there shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except as in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,
public safety or the economic well-being of a country.”106 Fortunately,
international treaties and agreements ratified since the Convention have
not echoed its curious assumption that privacy can only be violated by
governmental agencies.107

But international privacy norms have been no match for the
“wait and see” attitude that businesses benefiting from RFID technology
have been selling to the public and legislators alike. For example, a
recent California bill108 designed to set basic and reasonable standards for
RFID systems was steamrolled when Hewlett Packard, the American
Electronics Association, and the California Grocers Association argued
¶35

creativity. When the e-businesses technologies of tracking, classifying,
profiling, and monitoring were used to identify the preferences of American
consumers and to mirror back to each of us a market segmented version of
ourselves, Silicon Valley could argue that it was serving the cause of freedom
and individual choice.”).
106
Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (entered into force
Sept. 3, 1953), reprinted in 3 INTERNATIONAL LAW & WORLD ORDER: BASIC
DOCUMENTS III.B.2 (Burns H. Weston ed., 5 vols., 1994) available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm.
107
See European Convention for the Protection of Individuals With Regard to
the Automatic Processing of Personal Data, signed on Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T.S.
108, 20 I.L.M. 317 (entered into force Oct. 1, 1985); Directive 95/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, available at http://www.dataprivacy.ie/6aii.htm.
108
See S.B. 1834, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004), available at
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/academics/courses/is205/s05/Cal%20Sen%20B%
201834%20(2004).pdf.

22

2005

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 20

that “premature” regulation would “have unintended consequences”
although “[these industry groups] did not elaborate on those
consequences.”109 This “wait and see” attitude encourages Congress and
the citizenry at large to accept the truly fantastic idea that private
corporations will self-regulate a $900 million-dollar market—expected to
reach $2.3 billion by 2010—to protect consumer privacy. 110 As one
particularly astute citizen recently explained, the public is often
hoodwinked into dubious new technology because during its
development the associated social costs are either ignored completely or
cleverly minimized by private companies:
In our society, technology advances in a vacuum—the morality and
actual usefulness of a product is never considered while a technology is
under development; once it is developed, [corporations] assume they
have a right that supercedes the rights of all others to make money off a
product, regardless of how it affects other people. Marketing merely
steps into that vacuum . . . and markets technology without a thought as
to its adverse effects.111
¶36
This critique exaggerates somewhat the notion that RFID has
been developed and marketed ‘without a thought as to its adverse

109

Claire Swedberg, California RFID Legislation Rejected, RFIDJOURNAL.COM,
July 5, 2004, http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1015/1/1/. Since
SB 1834 was defeated, California lawmakers have introduced the Identity
Information Protection Act of 2005, an act that in its original form would have
prohibited the use of RFID tags in a range of identification cards in California,
including driver’s licenses, school ID-cards, and any identification card
associated with a government benefit program. See S.B. 682, 2005 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2005), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_06510700/sb_682_bill_20050511_amended_sen.pdf. After strong resistance by the
RFID lobby in California, the bill was amended twice to “allow the RFID
technology if it contains a unique personal identifier and not personal
information, such as an individual’s name, address, telephone number, date of
birth, Social Security Number or biometric identifier, among others.” Dibya
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effects.’ Many RFID applications will undoubtedly have a direct,
positive impact on human health and safety. For example, Applied
Digital’s VeriChip technology will one allow doctors in emergency
contexts to access medical records instantly. Nevertheless, it is worth
remembering that new technologies are often embraced not because they
are genuinely useful or necessary—but rather because they are already
available and ready-to-hand. The amendment proposed in this iBrief has
the virtue of allowing consumers a choice: it gives consumers the power
to reflectively endorse RFID, instead of merely accepting the ubiquity of
this technology after large, politically powerful companies have decided
that a radio frequency future is the only future.
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